Category Archives: Current Affairs

In my old post called You Have to Make People Give a Shit, I wrote:

[In school] you know your classmates and professor are going to read your writing — no matter what. It’s their job. … School, then, might breed a bad habit for aspiring writers and thinkers: the illusion that people will always read your entire essay just because it’s you.

The so-called real world is super competitive. Nobody will read your stuff (well, other than your mom) just because it’s you. The real-world reality is: No one cares what you think. It’s up to you make people give a shit.

From the Joseph Epstein essay on Kinderarchy, he also discusses the dangerous levels of self-importance of an over-parented generation:

So often in my literature classes students told me what they "felt" about a novel, or a particular character in a novel. I tried, ever so gently, to tell them that no one cared what they felt; the trick was to discover not one’s feelings but what the author had put into the book, its moral weight and its resultant power. In essay courses, many of these same students turned in papers upon which I wished to–but did not–write: "D-, Too much love in the home." I knew where they came by their sense of their own deep significance and that this sense was utterly false to any conceivable reality. Despite what their parents had been telling them from the very outset of their lives, they were not significant. Significance has to be earned, and it is earned only through achievement. Besides, one of the first things that people who really are significant seem to know is that, in the grander scheme, they are themselves really quite insignificant.

In other words, his students think that just because they have a thought it’s important.

I want to pile on, a little bit. It’s remarkable how many conversations in college are not conversations at all but rather the participants taking turns sharing their own opinion or experience, as opposed to probing on or advancing the prior point. For instance, the other week I had lunch with a college student. I raised the topic of education. I said that I’m not sure formal schooling is for everybody. She responded, "Well, see, I love school, and I’m thinking about graduate schools in these areas…" Off she went. Again. It was totally self-involved, and I’m afraid by now an unconscious, well-ingrained habit to immediately seize any opportunity to present a personal reflection and exploration.

Epstein focuses on youth, but it’s not just adolescents who suffer from everything-I-think-is-important syndrome. Adults similarly afflicted mask it with a whiff of social grace. The other day I met a professional, successful woman who overvalues her own airtime. After her monologue she said, "Enough about me. Tell me about yourself, Ben, where are you from?" She interrupted my answer to begin yet another self-centered philosophical session, an act which revealed the emptiness of her socially polite question. We all encounter these types of people.

The question is, do we encounter them more often? Is anything new? Is all that Epstein says and that I echo above unique to the current moment? I have no idea if now is a more narcissistic age, but if it is, I can think of a couple reasons why.

Some argue technology is a culprit in the sense that new technology can help a person enact an echo chamber around them that magnifies their own views. Or that technology facilitates, for example, twice or thrice daily phone calls between teens and parents, a frequency which — when aided by the over-parenting instincts of today’s boomers — nurtures self-obsession on the part of the teen. Or that blogs, such as the one I’m writing on right now (a noted irony!), enable a level of public disclosure that’s unhealthy because it can create a micro-celebrity effect. And when was the last time you met a celebrity (micro or macro) who wasn’t an egomaniac?

Some argue the rise of therapy culture contributes to the rise of self-centeredness. In 1980, Americans spent $2.4 billion on professional psychotherapy services; by 1997 the figure was an eye-popping $44.5 billion. It’s no secret that much of these services involve talking about yourself (often, it seems, to a point of circular misery).

Those seeing therapists a bit more serious than mere "counselors" — namely, therapists of the psychoanalytic Freudian tradition — indulge in themselves even more, as they embark on a twisted quest to re-interpret childhood events and draw connections between the most bizarre of symbols that Freud concocted with zero scientific basis. (For a fascinating screed on therapists and particularly Freudian ones, see the book Therapy’s Delusions: The Myth of the Unconscious and the Exploitation of Today’s Walking Worried by Ethan Watters and Richard Ofshe.)

To be clear, I respect and value a strong sense of individuality and admire people who think they have ideas worth sharing. Self-knowledge and reflection and a rich interior life: I respect all these things as well. And I’m not a technology cynic or against all forms of therapy. I’m just wondering aloud whether we’re witnessing increased levels of self-absorption nowadays, as Epstein suggests, and if so, why.

A few things I’ve written about have re-surfaced recently:

1. National Service. Here’s my Marketplace commentary on the issue. Jonah Goldberg wrote a column for the L.A. Times blasting national service and then chats with Peter Beinart in this Bloggingheads video about the topic (among other things). The stunningly articulate Beinart, who I’ve long been impressed with, challenges Goldberg for conflating the more extreme opinion of compulsory national service with the more mainstream opinion advocating just incentive-based national service.

2. Earnestness. Here’s my post questioning whether too much earnestness comes at the cost of a sense of humor. Maureen Dowd, who in general isn’t half as funny as she thinks she is, today asks whether Barack Obama’s "chilly earnestness" and humorlessness is a political weakness if it suggests an over-calculated quality. She notes that Bill Clinton has womanizing, John McCain has being an asshole, George Bush has the constant struggle with the English language — all aspects of their characters people can parody. It reminds me of the point from the memoir Clinton & Me, written by a humor speechwriter in the Clinton White House, who said that most people’s public persona are made up of a handful of obvious facts, and if you concede the obvious you gain back credibility while trading nothing.

3. Acting vs. Planning. Here’s my post responding to Cal Newport that "just get started" is bad advice. Cal responds by drawing distinctions between "goals" and "experiments," "habits" and "achievements."

Below is an adapted version of a paper I wrote a few months ago, citations stripped out. It’s a check-in on how Hong Kong is doing politically and economically since the Handover in ’97. The short answer seems to be: just fine. Economic growth is bustling, political freedoms are more or less respected by Beijing. More detail below. BTW – Hong Kong is one of my favorite cities in the world.

On July 1, 1997 Britain ceded control of its colony Hong Kong to the People’s Republic of China, ending 155 years of British rule. When the transfer agreement was made after the Treaty of Nanking, ‘97 seemed like a lifetime away, and Hong Kong did not have much economic significance. As the date drew nearer, however, Hong Kong had established itself as a financial hub in Asia, with a vibrant cosmopolitan culture, democratic processes, and an independent, more modern identity than mainland China. The “Handover,” as it is called, from Britain to China, therefore proved all the more intriguing because an important economic partner of the West was leaving its safe grasp and becoming a unit of a far less developed communist government.

•••

British Rule of Hong Kong

When the British took control of Hong Kong it was poor and uninhabited. While it had some useful natural features ⎯ such a deep lake area surrounded by hills, which eventually became the famed Hong Kong port ⎯ at the time none of this was developed, and there was much debate within British government about whether they should even invest in their new colony or not.  Left to their own devices, the inhabitants of Hong Kong fostered an atmosphere not unlike the “wild west” sense in the early days of America.

When Britain began attending to its Asian colony, it did so without much concern for local tradition or custom. There was little effort on the part of British officials to learn Chinese. British governors made laws with no input from locals. One scholar of Hong Kong characterized early British rule as “oppressive” but something that could “offer opportunities.”  Those opportunities, of course, came in the resources a modern, Western powerhouse could make available to a small island in underdeveloped Asia.

Indeed, were it not for British resources (and some might say its culture) Hong Kong would have not become, by the end of British rule, the world’s seventh largest holder of foreign reserves, third largest exporter of clothing, and second highest per capita GDP in Asia.  Hong Kong, with its British backing, established a beacon of stability in Asia, and was bridge to Western markets. Expats flocked and contributed to a genuinely cosmopolitan culture that made it appealing for businesspeople to conduct trans-national deals.

As Hong Kong grew in economic stature, its political system matured to resemble not only Britain in its freedoms but also Switzerland in its pro-business attitude toward policy. Taxes and tariffs were kept low. The country was ranked one of the easiest places in which to start a business.  From a democracy perspective, local representation was still limited (a small group of Hong Kong businessmen voted in a legislature of sorts) and universal suffrage non-existent. British governors ruled. But locals didn’t seem to care much, so long as their pocketbooks were full and freedoms of speech protected. The Chinese in Hong Kong grew accustomed to colonial rule, and as such were a bit apathetic about engaging in political debate. Compared to their neighbors on the mainland or in Southeast Asia, day-to-day life in Hong Kong looked pretty good.

•••

The Handover

The negotiations of Handover itself grappled with the fundamental challenge of autonomy. How autonomous will Hong Kong be within China? How will a liberal, more or less democratic place with press freedoms, an independent judiciary, and a stable private property / capitalist system be morphed into a government that is communist, censors its citizens, maintains a crooked judiciary, and allows only flashes of uninhibited capitalism? Will Beijing call all the shots? If not, which decisions are left to Hong Kong officials? These questions give a glimpse at issues negotiators from both sides (China and England) had to wrestle with. How, in other words, does the idea of “one country, two systems” actually get implemented?

In the end, China agreed to declare Hong Kong a “Special Administrative Region” which would enjoy a “high degree of autonomy” for at least the first 50 years of China control.  This meant the courts, free press, capitalist system, etc. would all be maintained independently in the short term. A “Chief Executive,” elected by an 800 person election committee in Hong Kong, would govern the state. The Chief Executive would govern in conjunction with the Hong Kong Legislative Council, a congress of sorts, which would be partially elected by the people and partially appointed by Beijing. The rule of law would change from British law to “Basic Law,” a Beijing-written constitution concerning Hong Kong. The most controversial aspect of Basic Law was Article 23 which said the Hong Kong government must enact legislation that “prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central People’s Government.”

At face value, these arrangements seem excellent: at least in the short term, Hong Kong would maintain its rich independent culture, currency, and democratic institutions. To simplify, the arrangement guaranteed that the flag flying high would change, and British troops would leave the island, but there would be no substantive overhauls.

The fear among democratic activists in Hong Kong and among Western observers was that China wouldn’t follow through on these commitments. After all, “high degree of autonomy” can be interpreted in many ways.

With 11 years of Chinese rule of Hong Kong now behind us, we can safely say that the reality is somewhere in the middle – China has not reneged on its commitments to maintain Hong Kong autonomy, but there is also some evidence that Beijing is dragging its feet on certain democratic measures to run out the clock until the 50th year of control, when they have no need to maintain Hong Kong as a special region.

•••

Political Situation

Political life under Chinese rule has changed in ways more invisible than visible. Universal suffrage still eludes the people and Beijing-appointed Chief Executives have proven less interested in advancing Hong Kong causes than pushing through Beijing policy. Yet British governors, even though they were probably more sympathetic to local causes than Beijing, still, in the end, represented the interests in Britain above all. So what are the “invisible” political changes?

Observers say that what’s changed in the political landscape in Hong Kong is an increased level of self-censorship on the part of the people and media.  People are less willing to speak out on issues that might contradict an official Beijing stance. Though in theory they are endowed with the right to do so, at least until 2047 at the 50 year anniversary of the Handover, people are nevertheless reticent. Beijing commits thousands of human rights violations each year on the mainland. Dissenters are hushed ⎯ even killed. Information is controlled. Who knows what Beijing might do to a loud democracy activist, for example, or a newspaper editor who consistently editorializes against the mainland? There have been cases of radio hosts mysteriously resigning after expressing negativity with the PRC.  Rather than risk it, people stay quiet.

It is impossible to measure self-censorship precisely. We do not know how many citizens or Hong Kong politicians have changed their attitudes out of fear of retaliation from Beijing.

One positive political development since the Handover is more local engagement in politics. Maybe because the leaders of Hong Kong are Chinese and not British, or because the “central office” is closer (Beijing and not London) ⎯ whatever the case, more Hong Kong citizens engage in politics.

Economic Situation

While politics in Hong Kong has a mixed picture now and an uncertain future (will democracy prevail? will Beijing infringe on political freedoms guaranteed in the Handover agreement?), the economic picture of post-Handover Hong Kong is clearer.

From an economic growth perspective, Hong Kong GDP is growing at a rate comparable to the period leading up to the Handover.  Moreover, the prospects for continued strong growth are likely due to China’s emergence as the largest developing economy. Despite a scare early on ⎯ the Asian Financial Crisis pulled Hong Kong into a recession literally the day of the Handover ⎯ the island recovered within a few years. Unemployment lessened. Economic ties with mainland China deepened thanks to a 2004 free trade agreement and a loosening of immigration restrictions between the two regions. Meanwhile, mainland China continues to post stellar growth numbers. Due to proximity and special agreements, Hong Kong companies get first dibs on mainland opportunities, and the mainland imports from Hong Kong tariff-free. 

Timing-wise the Handover may turn out to be perfect for economic growth. For many years, Hong Kong mooched off its powerful colonizer. Back then, Britain was a more formidable economic force. Hong Kong built up its infrastructure and culture under the umbrella of a rich, safe, free Western patron. Meanwhile, China was slowly but surely developing. Now, as the lines seem to cross on the graph, Hong Kong becomes part of a more stable China which is rising rapidly, and leaves behind a Britain whose time has come and gone.

In its current position as an economic hub, Hong Kong boasts close ties with China (it is, after all, part of the Beijing apparatus) as well as a history of Western-style freedoms. This means multinationals eyeing the Chinese market ⎯ and there are more of these opportunists than ever before ⎯ who are unwilling to enter the chaos that is Shanghai, opt to set-up shop in Hong Kong as a safe baby step.

So: economic life in Hong Kong post-Handover is strong and getting stronger.

•••

Conclusion

“Over the past 10 years, there have been some very bumpy moments – politically and economically. But some of the more dire predications I remember so vividly from 1997 have not come true. One country, two systems has worked,” British Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett said last year.  This seems to be the consensus among experts on the region. Fear mongers abound in 1997, predicting economic ruin, political overreach from Beijing, and so forth. Few of these fears have been realized. Has Hong Kong changed beyond a simple flag change? Yes. It is more Chinese than ever before. Hundreds of thousands of British and American ex-pats have left the city. The governing political bodies now draw more influence from their communist bosses in Beijing than their democratic and capitalist bosses in London. So culturally, yes, Hong Kong is different. Politically, yes, Hong Kong is different ⎯ probably for the worse, but Beijing still largely respects the Handover agreement. Economically little has changed besides deeper ties with the mainland. In sum, any changes that have occurred since 1997 have been on the margins. Hong Kong remains a dynamic economic powerhouse, with a mostly free press and a somewhat-representative government. Contrasted to the tense situation in Korea, or the Tibetan uprisings in mainland China, or the general instability and coup d’états that plague Southeast Asia, or the economic stagnation that seems to be afflicting Japan, Hong Kong is a bright spot in the Pacific Rim. For now. The next big juncture in this small island’s life will be in 2047, when China no longer has obligations to the international community over autonomy. Until then, Hong Kong gives us reason to smile.

An excellent paragraph by an excellent journalist on the very interesting mind of Andrew Sullivan and his adolotion of Obama:

Sullivan, a Burkean by philosophy but a radical by temperament, is the most interesting critic of his former conservative allies, and I’ve learned a lot about conservatism agonistes from reading his blog. He says that conservatism isn’t about solving problems but about recognizing the limits of man’s ability to do so, especially in the form of organized activity called government. His breakdown can’t help stacking the deck: conservatism is modest, skeptical, narrowly focussed on what can be done; liberalism tries, promiscuously, to satisfy everyone’s needs. Sullivan believes that the Republican Party went astray when it forgot its philosophical principles and started throwing more feed at the hogs of the electorate than Democrats. He is, in the terms of my article, a purist rather than a reformist, but his unhappiness with the movement is so great that it’s driven him into the arms of his exact opposite, Barack Obama, who is philosophically liberal and temperamentally conservative. Sullivan knows that his Oakeshottian version of conservatism is a very hard sell in a country that expects problems to come with solutions, and he seems to acknowledge that its future here belongs with the reformists like David Brooks, Ross Douthat, and Reihan Salam, who are readier than he is to accept that people have a right to want their government to improve their lives, not just to instruct them in the vanity of human effort. I read Sullivan every day, partly to find out how far his disenchantment will carry him in the very strange direction of Obama-style uplift—how long his temperament will win out over his ideas.

Sullivan posts too much to read in RSS, but it’s worth a weekly check-in for a stimulating perspective on the political scene.

Last night, at my favorite cafe in San Francisco, I said to a friend that Obama’s speech at Wesleyan kind of made me squirm. It’s the latest in a string of events that has made me less optimistic about his candidacy. Today, I was pleased to read David Boaz’s op/ed in the WSJ describing what I felt and why:

Sen. Obama told the students that "our individual salvation depends on collective salvation." He disparaged students who want to "take your diploma, walk off this stage, and chase only after the big house and the nice suits and all the other things that our money culture says you should buy."…

John McCain also denounces "self-indulgence" and insists that Americans serve "a national purpose that is greater than our individual interests." During a Republican debate at the Reagan Library on May 3, 2007, Sen. McCain derided Mitt Romney’s leadership ability, saying, "I led . . . out of patriotism, not for profit." Challenged on his statement, Mr. McCain elaborated that Mr. Romney "managed companies, and he bought, and he sold, and sometimes people lost their jobs. That’s the nature of that business." He could have been channeling Barack Obama.

"A greater cause," "community service" – to many of us, these gauzy phrases sound warm and comforting. But their purpose is to disparage and denigrate our own lives, to belittle our own pursuit of happiness. They’re concepts better suited to a more collectivist country than to one founded in libertarian revolution – a revolution intended to defend our rights to "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." …

They’re wrong. Every human life counts. Your life counts. You have a right to live it as you choose, to follow your bliss. You have a right to seek satisfaction in accomplishment. And if you chase after the almighty dollar, you just might find that you are led, as if by an invisible hand, to do things that improve the lives of others.

This is related to my Marketplace commentary on national service.